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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the infant biotechnology industry, led by small biotech-
nology companies, has produced numerous breakthrough drugs which have saved
lives, reduced suering and cut the cost of health care. Given that the bio-
pharmaceutical industry has only been in existence for a little over 20 years,
biotechnology holds enormous potential for the advancement of medical treat-
ments. Unfortunately, even with biotechnology, as with the more traditional
methods of drug development, the government mandated testing and approval
of new therapeutic products takes a considerable amount of time and costs an
exorbitant amount of money. The United States has the most demanding drug
approval process in the world. Under the current Food and Drug Administra-
1tion's drug approval process, the time required to gain approval for new drugs
averages between 10 to 12 years and the cost approximates $350 million.1 In
addition, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has come under attack as
taking too conservative of an approach to approving benecial new drugs.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the eects of this costly drug
approval process on small biotechnology companies, to determine the eects of
a decline in small biotechnology companies on the United States and to analyze
current proposals
to change the current Food and Drug Administration's drug approval process
to ensure the survival of small biotechnology companies.
Part II of this paper identies the various stages of the drug approval process.
Part III explores the policy behind the FDA's extensive drug approval process.
Part IV examines the adverse aects of the drug approval process on small
biotechnology companies. Part V analyzes the eect of a declining biotechnology
industry on the United States. Part VI addresses current proposals to change the
FDA drug approval process focusing on their ability to help small biotechnology
companies. II. FDA DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 amended by the Drug
1The Changing Environment for US. Pharmaceuticals, THE BOSTON CONSULTING
GROUP, Apr. 1993; See also Joan C. Hamilton et al., Biotech. America's Dream Machine,
BUS. WK., Mar. 2, 1992, at 66; David Hanson, Pharmaceutical Industry Optimistic About
Improvements at FDA, CHEM & ENG NEWS, Jan. 27, 1992, at 28.
2Amendments of 1962 regulates the approval of new drugs in the United States.2
Under the current regime, before a drug sponsor may market a drug in interstate
commerce, the FDA must approve the drug as safe and eective.3 Before the
FDA will approve a drug as safe and eective, the drug must undergo rigorous
testing procedures which are extremely time consuming and costly.
A. Pre-Clinical Testing
In pre-clinical testing, a new drug sponsor must conduct initial
investigations of the drug though extensive tests on laboratory animals. For
example, the FDA requires 12 months of toxicity tests in 2 species of laboratory
animals.4 This initial testing is conducted to ensure that the new drug is rea-
sonably safe for clinical trials and has the potential to treat a specic disease.5
This rst stage of testing takes approximately 3.5 years.6
B. Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New
Drug
If the pre-clinical investigations and animal testing indicate that
2The biologics Act of 1902 imposes additional requirements on biologics which include
many of the drugs produced by biotechnology companies. For example, biologics must be
produced in alicensed facility while drugs not classied as biologics simply must be manufac-
tured by good manufacturing practices. See Peter B. Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, FOOD
AND DRUG LAW (1991). Also, biologics are reviewed by a dierent center in the FDA
than traditional drugs. Id Despite these dierences, biologics and drugs are subject to the
same general approval process with the same structure of pre-clinical and clinical trials. For
purposes of this paper, the dierences in regulation will be immaterial and I will treat tradi-
tional chemically-derived drugs and biotechnology-derived drugs as being subject to the same
regulatory procedure.
3J. Nielsen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL DRUG LAW 14 (1986).
4John Patrick Dillman, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases. Desperate
Times Require Desperate Measures; 44 VAND. L. REv. 925, 928 (1991).
51d. at 928.
6Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 617 (1993).
3review, the agency may refuse to le the application.30 If the FDA refuses to
le the NDA, review of the NDA may not continue.31 The drug sponsor may
then meet with the FDA to discuss the agency's grounds for refusing to le
the NDA and may insist that the NDA be led over protest.32 Once the NDA
is led, the FDA's review of the NDA takes approximately 20 months.33 III.
POLICY BEHIND STRINGENT DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS:
HISTORY OF DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
The objective behind the FDA drug approval process is the protection of
United States citizens by ensuring that only safe and eective drugs reach the
marketplace. Therefore, the FDA regulatory system is set up to ensure that
all drugs brought to the market are safe, or in other words, present therapeutic
benets which outweigh their risks to health. Furthermore, all drugs marketed
must be eective so that individuals do not treat an illness with an ineective
drug. To understand the development of such an extensive system of drug
approval in the United States, it is necessary to review the history of drug
regulation in the United States.
Federal regulation of drugs and biologics commenced with the Vaccine Act
of 1913 (the Act) which was passed following the development of a small pox
30ld
31
32Id
33Lisa Piercey, FDA Review Times, Approvals Are Down, BIo WORLD TODAY, Jan. 19,
1995 at 1.
7COMPANIES
The approximate 1300 small biotechnology companies in the United States,
all less than 20 years old,47seeking to use cutting edge genetic or other technolo-
gies to create new drugs and health products, perform a substantial amount of
the United States' drug research.48 Approximately two dozen biotechnology-
derived drugs have entered the United States market.49 About 150 more are
in the Investigational stage.50 According to the Boston Consulting Group, an
average of one-third of all pharmaceutical research is based on molecular biol-
ogy.51
Nearly all of these biotechnology companies have no current prots nor prod-
ucts. Funding of biotechnology companies is based on the belief that these
companies will produce the world's future drugs which in turn will generate
47Cheryl D. Hardy, Patent Protection and Raw Materials. The Convention on Biological
Diversity and its Implications for US. Policy on the Development and Commercialization of
Biotechnology, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L 299, 300.
485ee John Eckhouse, Biotechnology Industry is Poised for Recovery. New Drugs Making
it to Market Sooner, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 7, 1994 at B 1.
49Charles Marwick, Biotechnology Industry Calls for Active US Role; Medical News Per-
spectives, 271 JAMA 648, 649 (1994). An example is Amgen, Inc.'s drug Epogen, which treats
anemia in endstage renal disease patients. See Hardy supra note 48 at 301. Other promising
biotechnology products have entered the United States market including treatment for the
side eects of chemotherapy, growth deciencies in children, heart attacks and AIDS related
anemia. Id
50Marwick supra note 50 at 649.
51Laurie Lewis, Manufacturers are Under Continuing Pressure to Reduce Prices, to Improve
Protability, 12 BUSINESS AND HEALTH 23, 25 (1994). Therefore, the fact that only 1 out
of 22 new drugs approved in 1994 was derived from biotechnology and that in 1993 only 4 out
of 25 were derived from biotechnology is misleading in evaluating the role of biotechnology in
future drug development. The infancy of biotechnology as a means to produce drugs combined
with the length of time required for drug approval has limited the number of biotechnology-
derived drugs that have reached the stage where they could be approved. Furthermore, it may
be a sign that the FDA has been too conservative in approving biotechnology-derived drugs.
10millions of dollars. However, the current drug regulatory scheme threatens the
existence of these small biotechnology companies. First, the extreme cost of
FDA drug approval increases the funding requirements of small biotechnology
companies and decreases investor's willingness to invest in these companies.
Second, the FDA's politically conservative approach to drug approval decreases
the chance that safe and eective drugs will be approved eectively penalizing
small biotechnology companies. These two problems have created a cash crunch
for small biotechnology companies which likely will result in a reduction in the
number of such companies in the future.
A. Extreme Cost of FDA Drug Approval
The extreme cost of the FDA drug approval process has created a perpetual
cycle of capitalization problems for small biotechnology companies: (1) The high
cost of drug approval combined with a small biotechnology company's limited
nancial resources limits the number of products that a biotechnology company
can develop and decreases the probability that a biotechnology company will be
able to survive the lengthy drug approval process; (2) Investors will not invest
because of the substantial risk associated with biotechnology companies due to
their reliance on a few products and due to the likelihood that a product will
never be approved; and (3) Investor's unwillingness to invest in biotechnology
increases the nancing problems of biotechnology companies.
11The process of drug development takes approximately 10 to 12 years and
costs approximately $350 million.52 Biotechnology companies burn consider-
able amounts of cash each month and generate no prots.. For example, in
1992, the average biotechnology company burned $664,000 a month.53 This
enormous burn rate, attributable to each drug run through the FDA drug ap-
proval process, limits the amount of potential new drugs that may be pursued
in the laboratory and in clinical trials by these small biotechnology compa-
nies. Therefore, small biotechnology companies base their success or failure on
a few drugs getting to market. Consequently, a failure of a drug in clinical
tests greatly devalues the company resulting in a substantial loss to investors.54
52The Changing Environment for US. Pharmaceuticals, THE BOSTON CONSULTING
GROUP, Apr. 1993; See also Joan C. Hamilton et al., Biotech: America~ Dream Machine,
BUS. WK., Mar. 2, 1992, at 66; David Hanson, Pharmaceutical Industry Optimistic About
Improvements at FDA, CHEM& ENG NEWS, Jan. 27, 1992, at 28.
53Sandra Sugawara, Biotech Firms Forming More Strategic Links: Young Industry Seeks
Support from Mature Corporations, THE WASHINGTON POST, October 19, 1992 at .
54The history of MedImmune, luc, a biotechnology company who has no current products
nor prots is illustrative of the risk associated with investing in biotechnology companies that
rely on a limited number of experimental drugs. In July 1994, MedImmune, Inc.'s stock price
closed at $4.87, down from a peak of $32.62 on November 1993. Stan Hinden, Washington
Investing: Lacking a Cure, MedImmune Saw its Stock Sicken, THE WASHINGTON POST,
August 1, 1994 at f25. The dramatic decline in the company's stock over this 10 month time
period can be attributed to the company's problems with the FDA approval of RespiGam,
an experimental drug designed to battle a respiratory virus that kills 4500 infants a year.
Id In November 1993, MedImmune completed its clinical tests on RespiGam as a potential
treatment for the virus and brought its results before an FDA panel. Id However, FDA denied
approval of the drug stating that more testing was necessary because mistakes were made in
the methods used in the three year study of the 249 children. Id After FDA disapproval,
the stock plummeted to $11.50 per share. Id The price of the stock plummeted further upon
MedImmune's announcement in July 1994 that the company would not pursue further clinical
tests of RespiGam. Id
ProCyte Corp., a biotech company in Kirkland, Washington is another example of
the reality of risky, long-term research and development projects. In October 1994, ProCyte
Corp. revealed that its breakthrough Lamin gel drug was not eective in treating diabetic
foot ulcers. Ronald E. Yates, Cash Crunch: Pushing Biotech Firms to Mortgage Technology,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, October 23, 1994 at 2. This revelation triggered a plunge in the stock
price from $6.12 to $2.37. Id
In the same month, Gensia Pharmaceuticals Inc., a San Diego biotech company,
released poor results of a clinical trial of its heart-surgery drug, Protara. Id Protara was sup-
posed to reduce the risk of heart attacks in bypass patients. Id However, the drug performed
no better than a placebo in clinical tests. Id Gensia's stock plunged from over $10 per share
to $4.62. Id
12As a result, investors have become unwilling to invest in such risky ventures55
which has left biotechnology companies scrambling for precious nancing for
drug research. B. Politically Conservative FDA
Political inuence on the FDA has caused the FDA to take an extremely
conservative approach to drug approval. The FDA does not base new drug
approval decisions by objectively weighing the benets of a new drug against its
potential costs. Rather, the FDA has taken the position that when the slightest
doubt exists about a drug's potential harm the drug should not be approved
even in the face of substantial evidence of the new drug's potential benets.
Business Week in its January 30, 1995 issue illustrated the FDA's conservative
approach to drug approval by reviewing Merck & Co.'s lack of success in getting
Varivax, a chicken pox vaccine, approved.
To some critics, nothing demonstrates FDA foot-dragging better than the
chicken pox vaccine Varivax. Since 1981, this vaccine has been tested safely on
more than 10,000 people in the U.S. Since 1984, 2 million children in Europe and
Asia have had versions of it. Yet Varivax is still lumbering through the FDA. An
FDA advisory committee rst recommended approval in January, 1990, a year
after Merck & Co. sought the OK. Early last year, a second panel pronounced
Varivax safe and eective. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the
555ee Marwick supra note 48. For example, the amount of money raised through initial
public oerings by biotechnology companies dropped from $33 million in 1991 to $22 million
in 1993. Id at 648. The total amount of money raised by biotechnology companies dropped
form $3.4 billion in 1991 to $2.8 billion in 1993. Id
13American Academy of Pediatrics both urge universal use
.
Yet the FDA is unapologetic about its tough stance. Data from 20 years' ex-
perience in Japan and elsewhere show that as many as 2% of inoculated children
develop mild cases of chicken pox, a higher failure rate than other childhood in-
oculations. Regulators also worry that { years later { Varivax might spawn adult
cases of the disease or trigger related viral conditions, such as shingles.56 Two
reasons lie behind the FDA's conservative approach to drug approval. First,
Congress controls the FDA through various devices and therefore controls U.S.
drug policy. Second, forces opposed to the introduction of new drugs have a
greater inuence on Congress than those that favor the introduction of new
drugs.
Congress mandates FDA drug approval policy through the use of
Congressional oversight committees which conduct rigorous hearings regarding
FDA policy. Since the passage of the Kefauver-Harris Amendment, the FDA
has been subject to almost continuous hearings from a number of well known
Congressmen, including Representatives Fountain and Rodgers and Senators
Kefauver, Kennedy and Nelson.57 Thus, the Commissioner of the FDA is sub-
ject to hostile Congressional hearings when the FDA deviates from Congression-
56John Carey, Joseph Weber and Joan O'C. Hamilton, Is the FDA Hooked on Caution,
BUSINESS WEEK, Jan 30, 1995. at 73. However, it must be noted that the FDA approved
Varivax on March 17, 1995. BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, FDA Approval. Vaccines to be
Available in 8 Weeks, March 23, 1995. However, this unexpected approval of the vaccine
does not minimize the tremendous amount of unnecessary time spent on reviewing this drug
especially given that the drug was recommended for approval by two independent advisory
groups years before its FDA approval.
57Frederick Beckner III, The FDA 's War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L. J. 529, 544 (1993).
14ally acceptable drug approval policy.58 Such pressure from Congress inevitably
shapes the FDA's drug policy.
Forces that oppose less drug regulation have more inuence on Congress than
forces in favor of less regulation. Consumer groups opposed to less regulation
of new drugs have engineered a considerable following and maintain substantial
inuence in Congress.59 These groups have used past drug tragedies as their
rallying cry. Deaths and deformities are vivid tangible results of less regulation.
These images compel membership by generating a fear of less regulation and by
creating a sense of moral duty to oppose less regulation. No Congressman wants
to say to his constituents that he was a responsible participant in a governmental
system that approved a thalidomide-type drug which causes 1000's of birth
defects.
Forces in favor of less regulation have had a tougher time generating support
for their cause.60 First, drug consumers have little incentive to join groups to
petition for less regulation. The drug lag does not result in vivid harms which
can be used as a source of an emotional rallying cry. Also, the benets derived
from less regulation are dispersed throughout country and therefore a free rider
585ee Id For example, in May 1969, the FDA decertied the drug Panalba by a summary
procedure without a prior hearing. UpJohn, the maker of the drug used its ties to the Nixon
Administration to get Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Robert Finch to order the
FDA to grant a hearing. When word of the intervention leaked to Congress, however, pressure
was quickly brought to bear on the FDA. The order to grant a hearing was reversed within a
day of being brought, and the President was forced to endure an embarrassing public hearing.
Id at 543-544.
59Id
60Id
15problem exists.61 Second, while the biotechnology industry has pushed hard for
less regulations, the drug industry as a whole does not share the same interests
with regard to the drug review process. Large drug companies benet from a
stringent drug approval process because it serves as a barrier to entry to the
small rms. Less regulation simply means more competition for the large rms.
Congressional control of the FDA and public sentiment against less regula-
tion have lead to the FDA's conservative approach to drug approval. Congres-
sional pressure on the FDA discouraging approval of potentially harmful drugs
may be described as intense.62 Countless Congressional hearings have been con-
ducted to criticize the approval of new drugs.63 Meanwhile, no hearing has been
conducted to investigate the failure of the FDA to approve new drugs.64 For-
mer FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt summarized the current inuence
of Congress on the FDA:
When it comes to pure unadulterated and directly applied pressure on the
FDA, the industry can't hold a candle to Congress. .. By far the greatest pres-
sure that the Bureau of Drugs or the Food and Drug Administration receives
with respect to the new drug approval process is brought to bear through Con-
gressional hearings... The message to the FDA could not be clearer. Whenever
611d at 547-549.
62Peter Barton Hutt, Investigations and Reports Respecting FDA Regulation of New Drugs,
33 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 537, 674.
63Id
645ee Id For example, Dr. Frances 0. Kelsey received the Presidential Award of Distin-
guished Federal Civilian Service from President John F. Kennedy for refusing to approve
Thalidomide. Id at538. However, it is unlikely that any such award would be granted to an
FDA ocial who approved a safe and eective drug.
16a controversy over a new drug is resolved by its approval, the Agency and the
individuals involved likely will be investigated. Whenever such a drug is disap-
proved, no inquiry will be made. The Congressional pressure for our negative
action is.
intense.65
As a result, the FDA is obsessed with minimizing risk keeping products o
of the market for years.
Not only has the FDA refused to approve drugs due to over caution against
the potential harms produced by new drugs. The FDA has also refused to
approve drugs based on politically motivated moral judgments. For example,
RU-486, a drug used as an abortifacient, is scientically benecial in that its
benets outweigh its risks.66 However, while countries such as Great Britain
have approved RU-486, the FDA has banned its importation. The reason for
such a ban appears to be purely political { the drug is used to cause abortions.
In other words, the FDA has played policy maker rather than the scientic
evaluator of new drugs.67 Such a systematic bias against the approval of drugs
65Beckner supra note 57 at 546.
665ee Claire L. Ahem, Drug Approval in the United States and England. A Question of
Medical Safety or Moral Persuasion?, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 93
(1994).
671t is also possible that politics could inuence the FDA to approve drugs which do not
have scientic merit. For example, in the instance of AIDS patients who are crying out for
any new drug. However, this situation is apparently rarer. Furthermore, applying a scientic
costlbenet analysis to all new drugs does not mean that experimental drugs for diseases
such as AIDS should not be allowed into the market before their eectiveness and safety have
been adequately revealed. Rather, this scientic method merely requires that the expected
benets of the drug be weighed against the cost of the drug not being available which is
often quite high given the seriousness of AIDS. Furthermore, an unpolitical scientic method
is superior in getting such drugs to market quicker because such a method would not limit
17compounds the problems faced by biotechnology companies. This bias reduces
the likelihood that a drug will be approved even if the product is scientically
benecial.68 This is problematic because the value of a biotechnology com-
pany to investors is based on the present value of expected future earnings of
the biotechnology company. Expected future earnings of a biotechnology com-
pany equal the expected revenues derived from sales of the company's drugs if
approved multiplied by the probability that the drugs will be approved. The
true value of a biotechnology company equals the present value of the expected
revenues derived from sales of the company's drugs if scientically benecial
multiplied by the probability that the drugs developed will be scientically ben-
ecial. Therefore, the FDA's refusal to approve scientically benecial drugs
reduces the investment value of a biotechnology company to a level below its
true value. A reduction in the value of biotechnology companies reduces their
attractiveness as investments resulting in less dollars being available for biotech-
nology companies.
C. Results: Cash Crunch for Small Biotechnology Compa-
nies
Robert T. Abbott, President and C.E.O. of Viagene, Inc. has best summa-
rized the cash crunch faced by small biotechnology companies:
accelerated approval to those drugs which treat the groups who scream the loudest. Thus,
experimental drugs for diseases such as cancer and altzheimers disease will also be given
accelerated treatment as well as the AIDS drugs if a scientic review requires them to be
approved.
68A drug is scientically benecial if its benets outweigh its risks.
18Most second and third tier biotechnology companies have less than 18 months
of funding, many have less than 12 months, and dozens have funding for less
than six months. According to a recent report by Dr. Robert Goldberg of
the Gordon Public Policy Center at Brandeis University, fully 75 percent of
biotechnology companies have 2 or less years of capital left. Ernst & Young
reports that biotechnology companies are raising capital now at 25 percent of
their burn rate (the rate at which capital is being expended.) As has already
been mentioned, there are approximately 1300 U.S. biotechnology companies.
That means that a staggering 975 companies will need to go to the market in
the next two years or face going out of business, merging or selling rights to a
larger rm. The seriousness of this situation cannot be overstated. The nanc-
ing climate for biotechnology companies is, frankly, hostile. Public oerings are
essentially impossible to undertake because of the depressed value of most com-
panies' stock. This eect is indiscriminate. Virtually all companies are aected,
regardless of company performance.69
This cash crunch in the biotechnology industry will lead to fewer biotechnol-
ogy companies in the United States with a resulting decrease in biotechnology-
derived drug innovation. The search for nancing is driving many of the small
biotechnology companies to trade precious technology for capital to foreign com-
petitors and large domestic pharmaceutical rms.70 Foreign competitors and
69Robert T. Abbott, Prepared testimony before the House Committee on Science, Space
and Technology (Sept. 28, 1994), in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE.
70Sugawara, supra note 53 at . In 1990, alliances with biotechnology companies accounted
19large domestic pharmaceutical companies are the recipients of small biotech-
nology companies' nancing troubles because these larger companies are able
to acquire the technology for cheep. In addition, the failure to raise cash may
cause a biotechnology company to scale back or cease operations. Companies
which scale back or cease operations generally abandon potentially promising
research resulting in less biopharmaceutical innovation.
Several experts agree with the theory that current government regulation will
lead to a decline in small biotechnology companies making the current industry
unrecognizable by the year 2000. George Rathman, founder of Amgen, the
nation's leading biotechnology company and now head of ICOS Corp., stated in
January 1995 that the biotechnology industry is now seriously threatened by the
performance of the FDA and the incredibly slow pace of approvals.71 Several
other experts agree with Rathman but vary by the degree to which they feel
small biotechnology companies are threatened. Steven Burrill, general partner
at biotechnology investment banker Burrill & Craves predicts that the number
of biotechnology companies may drop by almost a quarter to 1000 by the year
2000.72 John Sterling, managing editor of Genetic Engineering News has said
for 55 percent of the 304 strategic alliances formed between drug companies. Hardy supra
note 48 at 302. The agreements between small biotechnology companies and the larger drug
companies often take many forms. The large drug company may purchase a particular tech-
nology for their sole use and development. Id at 302-303. Sometimes, the larger company will
supply capital to the small biotechnology company and the biotechnology company in turn
will agree to share any prots derived from a successful product. Id
71David Baum an, Pharmaceutical Chief Says FDA Threatens US. Leadership, GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 18, 1995 at 2. A sign of the troubles faced by the biotechnology
industry was the collapse of D. Blech & Co., a preeminent Wall Street biotech investment
rm which recently ran out of cash. Dan Goldblatt, Time | And Money | Are Running
Out in Biotech, 7 BUSINESS DATELINE 1(1994).
72Ronald E. Yates, Biotechnology Blossoms, but Rivals Gaining on US., CHICAGO TRI-
BUNE, October 4, 1992 at 1.
20that biotechnology companies may drop to 750 by the year 2000.73 An article
in the September 26, 1994 issue of Business Week predicts that perhaps three
quarters of United States biotechnology rms are destined to fold or merge.74
Robert Abbott also foresees a dramatically dierent biotechnology industry
in the United States in the future:
The industry is now beginning to see signicant layos ... I believe these
layos will forever impact our industry because of the psychological damage
that is occurring. Entrepreneurial companies are staed by people in the early,
energetic part of their careers because of the long working hours and dedica-
tion required. Salaried employees often work 60 to 70 hours per week without
additional compensation.
They are motivated to do this because they share in the company's vision
and identify with the entrepreneurial spirit of the workplace. When, and if,
such a company has its rst lay-o, an irreparable break in trust occurs be-
tween the company and its employees. Sadly, it is usually the survivors of the
lay-o who are the most aected. From that point forward, the work ethic
is never the same. I believe that the layos that are now occurring, because
of this longest-ever hostile nancing environment, will forever change the pro-
73Gail Dutton, Biotech: Risky Business?, 84 MANAGEMENT REvIEW 36 (1995).
74Joan O'C. Hamilton, An Industry Crowded with Players Faces an Ugly Reckoning, BUS.
WK., Sept. 26, 1994 at 84.
21ductivity of our biotech industry, dulling it from what it has been previously.75
V. DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES
Given that the current FDA drug approval process has created a self perpet-
uating cycle of capitalization problems for small biotechnology companies, it is
important to evaluate the eect that a decline in the number of small biotech-
nology companies will have on the United States. I believe that unless the FDA
reduces the cost of drug approval for biotechnology companies and removes poli-
tics from its drug approval decisions, the potential decline of small biotechnology
companies will result in the following adverse eects on the United States: (1)
the substantial reduction in the introduction of innovative new drugs; (2) the
decline of the United States as a world leader in biotechnology; and (3) the loss
of an opportunity to pursue a potential economic gold mine.
A. The Substantial Reduction in the Introduction of Inno-
vative New Drugs
1. The demise of small biotechnology companies will reduce the introduction of innovative biotechnology-derived drugs.
The demise of small biotechnology companies will decrease the number of inno-
vative new drugs introduced in the United States. A substantial proportion of
the novel and innovative research in the biopharmaceutical area is performed by
the approximate 1300 small biotechnology companies. The increasing number of
75Abbott supra note 69.
22partnerships between small biotechnology companies and large drug companies
whereby the large drug companies purchase the small biotechnology companies'
technology serves as evidence of the substantial role small biotechs play in novel
scientic experimentation.76 Given the substantial role small biotechs play in
biotechnology research and given the importance of biotechnology in the de-
velopment of new drugs, a decline in these small biotechnology companies will
decrease new drug development substantially.
There are several possible explanations for why a large share of the novel
research in biotechnology takes place in the small biotechnology companies.
First, nancial incentives exist for scientists who engage in innovative biotech-
nology research to either start up their own biotechnology company or perform
research for a small biotechnology company. Well known and highly respected
scientists probably hold a somewhat inated sense of condence in their ability
to produce a workable product. The successful introduction of a new drug may
generate hundreds of millions of dollars for a small biotech. Therefore, a large
equity stake in a small biotechnology company may be more appealing to a
highly skilled scientist than a salary paid by a large pharmaceutical company.
However, large pharmaceutical companies provide greater assurance to their
scientists that projects will not be cut o due to lack of funds. Nevertheless,
this fact is mitigated somewhat because a small biotechnology company is more
likely than a large pharmaceutical company to remain faithfully committed to
765ee Sugawara, supra note 53 , at ; see also Sandra Sugawara, Centocor Selling S Percent
of Stock to Lilly. Firm Arranges Cash Infusion After FDA Rejection of Product Tests, THE
WASHINGTON POST, July 17, 1992 at bi.
23a particular research project because unlike the large pharmaceutical company
who has several other products in research, the small biotech's success or failure
is based on a small number of research projects.
Second, much of the current drug experimentation and innovation
is based on potential cost advantages of new products over existing products.
Small biotechnology companies have a greater incentive than large pharmaceu-
tical companies to innovate based on cost advantages of new drugs over drugs
already on the market because the drugs on the market are manufactured by
the large pharmaceutical companies.77 Third, large pharmaceutical companies
are constrained by their shareholders who prefer a consistent return on their in-
vestments. To the extent biotechnology research is viewed as risky without the
potential for consistent returns, large pharmaceutical companies will be limited
in how many resources may be allocated to biotechnology research. Unlike the
shareholders of large pharmaceutical companies, shareholders of biotechnology
companies do not expect consistent returns on their investment. Shareholders
of biotechnology companies invest with the hope that novel biotechnology ex-
perimentation will lead to large prots in the future but at the risk of large
losses.
Finally, large pharmaceutical companies have limited resources to
devote to biotechnology research and have limited expertise in biotechnology.
Large pharmaceutical companies, unlike most of the small biotechnology com-
775ee Richard J. Nelson, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs. 'Giant Step for the Sick
and Dying'?, 77 GEO. L. J. 463 (1988) (which suggests that the PMA which is dominated
by large pharmaceutical companies prefers the status quo over changes that reduce the costs
of drug approval because reducing the costs of drug approval decreases the barriers to small
biotechnology companies from competing with large pharmaceutical companies)
24panies, already have drug products on the market. Therefore, a substantial
amount of a large pharmaceutical company's resources must be devoted to man-
ufacturing and marketing activities. Large pharmaceutical companies devote
approximately 15 percent of their sales revenues to research and development
while small biotechnology companies devote approximately 80 percent of their
resources to research and development.78
Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies devote a limited proportion of their
research and development budget to biotechnology-derived drug development.
Most drugs produced by large pharmaceutical companies have historically been
derived from molecular chemistry, not biology. Therefore, over time, large drug
companies have developed considerable expertise in molecular chemistry rather
than in molecular biology. Any biotechnology experimentation by large phar-
maceutical companies
24
entails shifting resources away from this area of expertise to molecular bi-
ology. In a large corporation, such a shift is undoubtedly slow and met with
considerable protest.
2. The results of a reduction in innovative drug production on the United
Slaks. A reduction in U.S. drug innovation will lead to two results. First, less
78Dutton supra note 73.
25innovation will lead to continuing increases in health care costs. Biopharma-
ceutical experimentation is based on creating products with some form of a
cost advantage. Biotechnology companies are working on developing cures and
treatments for diseases which ultimately will reduce the cost of health care. By
attacking life-threatening diseases, new biotechnology drugs will reduce the av-
erage stay in hospitals, cut the need for operations and decrease the frequency
of the usage of many medicines.
Several commentators, including the Clinton administration, have argued
that drug companies contribute to the rise in health care costs because of high
drug prices. However, this argument fails as applied to small biotechnology
companies for several reasons. First, large drug companies factor into their
drug prices expenses other than research and development such as marketing
costs. Since small biotechnology companies devote almost all of their resources
to research and development, the prices for drugs introduced by these small
biotechs will better reect the actual cost of developing the drug. Second, the
escalation in drug prices has slowed substantially. After rising at nearly double-
digit rates in 1990 and 1991, average drug prices rose 5.7 percent in 1992 and 3.4
percent in 1993.79 Third, drug prices simply reect the cost of developing a new
drug. Therefore, the FDA is partly to blame for high drug prices and a reduction
in the cost of drug approval will lead to a decline in drug prices.80 Finally, new
79Laurie Lewis, Manufacturers are Under Continuing Pressure to Reduce Prices, to Improve
Protability, 12 BUSINESS & HEALTH 23 (1994).
80This statement is supported by Representative Duncan from Tennessee:
Mr. Speaker, when people wonder why drugs cost so much in this country, all they
need to do is look at the FDA. The over regulation and bureaucratic mumbo jumbo has helped
26drugs will be marketed successfully only if they cost less than existing therapies.
For example, if surgery is less costly than a new drug treatment, surgery will
be preferred and the new drug will not sell.
Reduced innovation also will lead to many Americans being denied biotechnology-
derived drugs which could have been developed to prevent, cure or treat their
ailments. The costly FDA drug approval process inhibits advancements against
diseases and prolongs victims' suering. Many commentators criticize the FDA's
drug approval process as creating a drug lag in the United States.81 Patients in
the United States receive approved drugs later than their foreign counterparts.
The decline in biotechnology companies due to the FDA drug approval process
leads to an even more serious result: large numbers of innovative biotechnology-
derived drug therapies that would have been developed under a less stringent
regulatory regime may never be developed. For example, if penicillin had not
been discovered and a small biotechnology company with nancing troubles was
developing penicillin today, a strong possibility exists that penicillin would never
be developed. The loss of even one drug like penicillin would harm more peo-
ple than all of the drug toxicity in the history of modern drug development.82
the big drug giants, but has made it almost impossible for small companies to participate and
has driven drug and medicine prices sky high. 140 CONG. REC. H6437-Ol.
81Several studies have been performed analyzing the eect the FDA drug approval process
has oninnovation. A 1973 study by Sam Peltzman, an Economist from the University of
Chicago Graduate School of Business, examined new drug innovation. He found that the
United States had seen a 50percent drop in the number of drugs that reach market each year
following the passage of the Drug Amendments of 1962. Peter Brimelow and Leslie Spencer,
Food and Drugs and Politics, FORBES, Nov. 22, 1993 at 115. A recent study conducted by
Tufts University found that 80 percent of the drugs approved by the FDA between 1987 and
1989 were available in other countries by an average of 6 years earlier. Id
825ee John Patrick Dillman, PrescrIption Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases. Desper-
ate Times Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND. L. REv. 925, 928 (1991). For example,
a 1967 to 1976delay in the approval of beta blocker compounds that treat hypertension and
27B. The Decline of the United States as a World Leader in
Biotechnology
Since the advent of the biotechnology revolution in the 1980's, U.S. biotech-
nology companies have continued to hold their worldwide lead in biotechnology
innovation.83 For example, as of September 20, 1993, gures from the United
States Patent and Trademark Oce show that the United States was the coun-
try of origin for 1441 of the 2094 biotechnology health care patents issued in
the United States, representing almost 69% of the total.84 Japanese companies
were issued the second largest number of such patents with 13% of the total,
followed by Europe with 12%.85 However, given the increasing cost of the FDA
drug approval process and the increasing reluctance of United States investors
to nance such costs, as evidenced by the depressed biotech equity markets,
combined with increasing foreign commitments to biotechnology, it is likely
that the United States will lose its status as the world's dominant producer of
biotechnology.
First, U.S. companies are being driven from the U.S. by the FDA drug
approval process to places such as Europe because it is easier to conduct research
other cardiovascular diseases was responsible for over 10,000 deaths annually. Id
Another example of the costs of a drug not reaching the public is that of the neu-
rological drug sodium valproate which could have prevented an estimated 1,000,000 epileptic
seizures per year at a savings of $100 million in reduced disability and increased eaming
capacity. Id
83Yates, supra note 72 at B 1.
84Kevin Hamilton, PMA Finds 143 Biotech Medicines in Testing, a Gain of 80% in S
Years, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWEEK 3, Sept. 20, 1993.
851d
28and development in Europe.86 European clearance processes are quicker and
easier.87 Also, European marketing restrictions are more relaxed. Approval for
a clinical trial in Europe takes about a month, while in the United States it can
take up to 14 months.88 During the ten year period from 1977 to 1987, 114 new
drugs were available sooner in Great Britain than in the United States. During
this same period of time, 41 new drugs were available sooner in the United
States.89 Respiratory medicines took an average of 3 years longer to be marketed
in the United States and cardiovascular medicines were delayed an average of
5 years.90 Furthermore, the gap is likely to grow with the establishment of the
pan-European Medicines Evaluation Agency in l995.91
A vaccine which prevents Hepatitis A serves as an example of the dierence
between the United States' drug regulatory system and that of foreign countries.
An application for the vaccine which prevents Hepatitis A was led with the
FDA in July, 1992.92 The FDA has not approved the drug even though it
was recommended for approval in 1994 by an FDA advisory committee.93 This
Hepatitis A vaccine has been approved in 40 other countries.94
86Daniel Green, Survey of Venture and Development Capital, THE FINANCIAL TIMES
LIMITED, September 23, 1994 at IV. Capital outow from the United States medical tech-
nology industry has increased from $321 million in 1990 to $993 million in 1994. Alan M.
Slobodin and Roman P. Storzer, FDA Paralysis Raises Health Care Costs, 9 LEGAL BACK-
GROIJNDER 39 (1994).
87Slobodin and Storzer, FDA Paralysis Raises Health Care Costs, 9 LEGAL BACK-
GROUNDER 39 (1994).
88Green supra note 86.
89Slobadin and Storzer supra note 87.
90Id
91Green supra note 86.
92Extreme Measures Against Agency Unlikely Despite Recent Criticisms, HEALTH CARE
POLICY REPORT, Jan. 23, 1995.
93Id
94Id
29The creation of plants in foreign countries will inevitably lead to increasing
expertise of foreign scientists in biotechnology. Also, the shifting of research and
testing oversees reduces the probability that benecial drugs will be marketed
in the United States. Biotechnology companies that get a drug approved for
overseas markets may not wish to invest the resources necessary to get the drug
approved in the United States.
Second, foreign countries have recognized the great importance of biotech-
nology as a protable business in the global economy. In 1992, Steven Burrill,
then national director of manufacturing and high technology services for Ernst
& Young, reported that even though American rms dominate biotechnology,
Japan, France and Great Britain are equal to the U.S. industry when it comes
to research.95 Furthermore, Japan has made it a national priority to dominate
the biotechnology industry by the year 2000.96 In addition to developed coun-
tries, growing competition may also come from countries in Eastern Europe and
Latin America making the transition to free-market economies.97 These third
world countries see biotechnology as an opportunity to develop native scientic
talent and agricultural resources.98
Third, since biotechnology companies can no longer depend on the stock
95Yates, supra note 72 at 1.
96Id
97Id
98Id
30market for capital because U.S. investors are reluctant to pay the excessive FDA
drug approval costs for risky products, U.S. biotechs are reaching to European
and Japanese investors.99 Foreign acquisition of small U.S. biotechnology com-
panies paves the way for Japanese and European countries to grab a stake in the
global biotechnology industry. In return for the capital supplied, these foreign
investors usually acquire rights in the company's valuable technology, signicant
equity positions in the company, and/or seats on the board of directors.100 Due
to small biotechnology companies' need for capital, foreign companies are able
to extract substantial value from the small biotechnology companies in return
for the capital supplied.
Foreign acquisitions of U.S. biotechnology companies during the 1990's have
included: Japan's Chugai Pharmaceuticals Inc's acquisition of Gen-Probe, Inc;
Germany's Schering AG's acquisition of Triton Biosciences Inc.; France's Sano's
acquisition of Genetic Systems Corp.; and Switzerland's Roche Holding Ltd.'s
acquisition of a sixty percent share in Genentech, Inc.101 These acquisitions
along with the multitude of other foreign acquisitions of small U.S. biotechs
raises concerns about the selling of U.S. technology to foreign companies. Gen-
erally, these mergers create a ow of information out of the United States into
foreign countries without a corresponding inux of technology into the United
States.102 This outow of information strengthens the foreign markets and
995ee Sugawara, supra note 53.
1005ee Yates supra note 72; see also Sugawara, supra note 53.
101Hardy supra note 47.
102Id.
31weakens the United States' ability to compete and commercialize this technol-
ogy.103
The decline of the United States' dominance in the biotechnology
industry is problematic for two reasons. First, increasing competition in the
global marketplace in biotechnology increases the competition for nancing.
This increase in competition perpetuates the current problems for small U.S.
biotechnology companies { the lack of money to nance drug approval.
Second, biotechnology like computer chip technology, communication tech-
nology, etc. may be a source for considerable future revenues derived from both
sales in the United States and abroad. Thus, if the U.S. biotechnology industry
remains dominant in the global market, the U.S. will generate a substantial
trade surplus in biotechnology-derived drugs. As an example, innovation fos-
tered by successful investment has produced a $5 billion trade surplus in 1993
on exports of $15 billion in the medical device industry.104 A trade surplus in
the biopharmaceutical drug industry will reduce the United States decit while
a trade decit in this industry will lead to the opposite result. Therefore, pros-
perity in the biotechnology industry has far reaching budgetary consequences.
Consequently, the U.S. should take rational steps to prevent the erosion of its
global dominance of the biotechnology industry.
C. The Loss of a Valuable Economic Opportunity
103Id.
104Slobodin and Storzer supra note 87.
32A 1994 Ernst & Young survey of the biotechnology industry found that
there are 1272 biotechnology companies in the United States.105 These 1272
biotechnology companies employ approximately 100,000 highly skilled, highly
paid people nationwide.106 Current annual industry revenues total approxi-
mately $11.2 billion.107 Given the infancy of the biotechnology industry and
its importance to future drug development, the industry has the potential to
grow at an extremely fast rate with an accompanying growth rate in skilled
jobs. These 1272 small biotechnology companies have the potential to earn
$100 billion by the year 2000.108 Sales of biopharmaceutical drugs alone have
the potential to reach $60 billion by the turn of the century. 109
Several areas in this country depend on the biotechnology industry for the
jobs it produces and the income it generates. For example, California is the
home of 30% of U.S. biotech companies and provides 38% of the biotechnology
industries' jobs.110 Given the importance of biotechnology in California, it is
understandable why the Los Angeles Times in 1993 stated that growth in the
biotechnology industry is essential to California because growth in the biotech-
nology industry counteracts the fear that the state's prolonged recession will tilt
the job base away from skilled jobs, represented by declining industries such as
105Eckhouse, supra note 48 at Bi.
106Id
107Biotech Down, But Don 't Count it Out, Analyst Says, THE SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL,
Nov. 20, 1994 at lOB.
108Hardy supra note 47.
109Id:
110Id:
33aerospace, toward low-wage manufacturing and service jobs.111 The Los Ange-
les Times also reported that the key to biotechnology's expansion in California
is that venture capital continues to pour in.112
Baltimore, Maryland, Cambridge-Boston, Massachusetts and New Jersey
also possess substantial economic interests in the survival of the biotechnology
industry. Baltimore has spent substantial sums to attract biotechnology compa-
nies to the Baltimore area. Baltimore believes that the biotechnology industry
can revitalize its downtown area which was left with little nancial resources
after young professionals moved out of downtown.113 The Cambridge-Boston
area also has a substantial economic stake in the biotechnology industry. Within
this area is one of the largest congregations of biotechnology companies in the
country.114 New Jersey is the fourth largest center of biotechnology companies
in the U.S. There are an estimated 80 biotechnology companies in the state.115
Given biotechnology's current and potential economic importance, the U.S.
economy will suer from a decline in the biotechnology industry. For exam-
ple, ImmunoGen, Inc.'s troubles cost the Cambridge-Boston area over 100 jobs
and accompanying economic problems. ImmunoGen Inc. laid o 102 employ-
111Chris Kraul, Biotech Blossoms: Industry Hiring is Up Despite Statewide Slump, L.A.
TIMES, July28, 1993 atBi.
112Id.
113Roy Furchgott, Baltimore has Seen the Future, and It is Biotechnology, N.Y. TIMES,
August 28, 1994 at Section 3, page 7; See also Lori Silver, Biotech 's Stunted Growth; NIH
Inuence, Lack of Capital Slow Maryland Firms in Race to Develop Drugs, THE WASH-
INGTON POST, October 8, 1990 at 1.
114Ronald Rosenberg, Biotech Gold Lures New Wave of Cash, BOSTON GLOBE, November
12, 1991 at 37.
11519 of these 80 biotechnology companies are publicly held. Id
34ees and temporarily closed two manufacturing facilities after learning that an
expected $20 million investment from a European pharmaceutical company fell
through.116 ImmunoGen Inc. is illustrative of the problems faced by most small
biotechnology companies today. ImmunoGen Inc. has a product in phase III of
the FDA approval process. ImmunoGen had raised $130 million, but is now left
with only $11 million in cash.117 Therefore, cutting costs was ImmunoGen's only
alternative.118 VI. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORMS
A multitude of proposed reforms have arisen out of the criticism directed at
the FDA drug approval process. The preponderance of the proposals generally
t within one of two classes: (1) Re-structuring or replacing the FDA to ensure
more ecient review of new drug applications and more scientically-based
standard setting; and
(2) De-regulation of the drug approval process so that drugs reach the market
sooner. I will analyze some of the current proposal's eects on small biotech-
nology companies and on the welfare of the United States. I will then present
my own proposals which I feel will benet biotechnology companies without
imposing unnecessary risks on the U.S. population.
A. The Players
116Ronald Rosenberg, ImmunoGen Lays o 102, Shuts 2 Plants, BOSTON GLOBE, De-
cember 20, 1994 at 41.
117Id:
118Id:
35
Reforming the FDA drug approval process to reduce the cost of drug approval
has gained the attention of a new coalition of industry critics, conservative
groups and powerful Republican lawmakers.
1. The Progress & Freedom Foundation. The Progress & Freedom Foun-
dation, a think tank aliated with House Speaker Newt Gingrich, has raised
$400,000 from drug, biotechnology and medical device companies in part to
nance a study on how to reform the FDA and its drug approval process.119
2. Citizens for a Sound Economy. Citizens for a Sound Economy, a con-
servative advocacy group that has made public an opinion survey critical of
the FDA by an inuential pollster is preparing a grass routes drive to build
Congressional support for revamping the FDA.120
3. Thomas J. Bliley. Jr. House Commerce Committee Chairman,
Thomas
J. Bliley Jr., Republican from Virginia who also heads the House Biotech-
nology Caucus will champion Congressional hearings to be begun in 1995 which
will scrutinize the FDA's operations.121
4. Newt Gingrich. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich,
119Peter H. Stone, Ganging up on the FDA, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Feb. 18, 1995 at 410.
120
1211d, See also Steve Usdin, Good vs Perfect, BIOCENTURY, Jan. 30, 1995 at 1.
36is the grandfather of the FDA reform movement. He has publicly denounced the
agency as the leading job killer in America.122 He has deemed FDA Commis-
sioner David Kessler to be a bully and a thug.123 In the fall of 1994, he urged a
crowd of biotech executives to work with the Progress & Freedom Foundation on
its study and brought a top biotech industry executive onto his cable television
show to discuss major changes to the FDA.124
5. The Biotechnology Industry. On February 8, 1995, about 55 biotech
executives made a pilgrimage to Washington D.C. where they met with sev-
eral members of Congress including Representative Joe L. Barton, Republi-
can from Texas, the Chairman of the Commerce Oversight Subcommittee, to
discuss FDA reform.125 The industry is likely to play a prominent role as
FDA reform battles heat up.126 The reforms sought by the biotechnology
industry include faster drug approvals, privatizing some of FDA
0
s functions
and eliminating inconsistencies between regulations of drugs and biologics.127
6. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRIn4A).
PhRMA will likely play a prominent role in FDA reform. PhRMA President
Gerald Mossingho said that the group might suggest that the FDA privatize
key missions, including NDA reviews.128 Their goal is to get the FDA to em-
122John Carey, Joseph Weber and Joan O
0
C. Hamilton, Is the FDA Hooked on Caution?,
BUS. WK., Jan. 30, 1995 at 74.
123Id:
124Stone supra note 119 at 410.
125Id:
126
127
128Usdin supra note 121 at3.
37ulate the European system in which reviewers are drawn from industry and
academe.129 Mossingho has also called for a reduction in the FDA
0
s require-
ments for documentation, especially for early stage clinical trials.130
B. Restructuring the FDA: The Issue of Privatization
Several dierent proposals to restructure the FDA to increase the eciency
of drug approval in the United States have been mentioned over the past year.
First, I will analyze a current proposal to revamp the FDA replacing it with a
private body to regulate drug approvals. Then, I will propose a modied version
of this privatization proposal which I feel will better serve the biotechnology
industry and the United States. Finally, I will demonstrate why less radical
reforms will fail to improve substantially the current system.
1. The Proposal: Replacement of the FDA with a Private Organization Responsible for Drug Approval.
Several politically powerful individuals and organizations favor replacing the
FDA with a private organization to review drug applications and to set drug
approval standards.131 This private organization would be staed with members
of the drug industry, including scientists, doctors and medical entrepreneurs.132
129
130
1315ee Lisa Nevans, Republicans have Talked of Killing o the FDA: Agency Faces Uncertain
Future, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 27, 1994 at CS (for example Newt Gingrich in
September launched a Medical Innovation Project to design a replacement for the FDA while
other conservative think tanks are working on proposals to privatize the entire drug approval
process and/or dismantle the FDA).
1321f conicts of interest arise in the review of a new drug one of two things may be done:
(1) the reviewer with a conict would have to disclose it and continue to review the drug
which generated the conict or (2) the reviewer with the conict would have to withdraw
38According to the proposal, Congress would ordain the group with the exclu-
sive statutory authority to review and approve new drugs.133 This new private
agency would take on all of the FDA
0
s current duties with regard to the ap-
proval of new drugs.134 The agency would be responsible for setting the data
requirements necessary for approval, for establishing the regulations concern-
ing preclinical and clinical trials and for reviewing all data and making drug
approval decisions based on that data.
2. Justications for proposal. The inuence of political pressure on the FDA
stands as the primary justication behind this proposal to revamp the FDA and
replace it with an independent private agency. Since the FDA has been unable
to regulate drugs based solely on scientic merit, replacing the FDA with a
private independent organization removed from the inuence of Congress frees
the review process from political conservatism.
Lawmakers have several means to ensure that the newly formed private
organization remains outside of the political pressures of Washington. First,
Congressional involvement with the new agency must be limited. Therefore,
Congress
0
role would be limited to granting statutory authority to the new
organization and to funding the organization135. Second, drug reviewers must
be subject to strict term limits. Term limits would ensure that the organization
from reviewing the drug.
133
134
135Congress should defer to the expertise of the new private agency as to the amount of
funding necessary to conduct an ecient review.
39will be staed by individuals who have no long term connection to the political
machinery in Washington D.C.
The fact that the FDA is an inecient governmental bureaucracy serves
as a second justication for replacing the FDA with a private organization.
According to this argument, the FDA is an inecient governmental agency
which fails to promote good work and fails to punish abuses of discretion. FDA
employees like employees of other governmental departments are accused of not
having the correct incentives to eciently analyze data. Representative Duncan
from Tennessee has made this argument against the FDA on the oor of the
House of Representatives:
Mr. Speaker, when people wonder why drugs cost so much in this country,
all they need to do is look at the FDA. The over regulation and bureaucratic
mumbo jumbo has helped the big drug giants, but has made it almost impossible
for small companies to participate and has driven drug and medicine prices
sky high.. . Why, Mr. Speaker, is there all this waste and ineciency, all
this arrogance and abuse of power? I believe it is primarily because of our
civil service system, a system that does almost nothing for good, dedicated
employees, but serves now to protect lazy and incompetent ones. We have
many good people working for our Federal Government, but we cannot get rid
of those who don
0
t work hard or those who treat people badly.136
136140 Cong. Rec. H6437-01, July 28, 1994.
403. Benets of the proposal. Replacing the FDA with a private reviewing
body will benet small biotechnology companies in three ways: (1) Drug review
times will decrease; (2) The likelihood of approval will increase; and (3) Data
requirements and pre-clinical and clinical regulations will decrease.
a. Decreased drug review times. Drug review times will decrease dramat-
ically. Political conservatism on the part of the FDA has slowed the review
of drugs substantially. The inuence of politics on the FDA has manifested in
FDA demands for more data, in FDA requirements of longer periods of testing
and in FDA
0
s extensive scrutiny of data beyond what is scientically necessary.
Decision making based solely on science will reduce the delays caused by politi-
cal conservatism. In addition, more ecient review of drugs will reduce review
times.
Lengthy review times of completed NDAs hurt small biotechnology compa-
nies. Currently, a biotechnology company must wait approximately 20 months
after the completion of Phase III clinical tests for an approval/non-approval de-
cision to be made by the FDA.137 The FDA estimates that companies may earn
an average of $10 million for each additional month they have a drug on the mar-
ket.138 In other words, biotechnology companies lose approximately $10 million
137Piercy supra note 33.
138Sandra H. Cuttler, The Food and Drug Administration
0
s Regulation of Genetically En-
gineered Human Drugs, 1 J. PHARMACY AND LAW 191, 208 (1993).
41for each month that approval is not granted following completion of clinical test-
ing. Such a loss of money diminishes the return to investors in biotechnology
companies that successfully develop a drug product. Lower returns from devel-
oping drugs translate into lower investor valuations of biotechnology companies
which contributes to the drying up of the biotech equity markets.
Shortening the NDA review process is critical to the improvement of the
biotechnology industry. For example, cutting the NDA review time by 15
months (from the current 20 months to 5 months) would enable biotechnol-
ogy companies to generate approximately $150 million during a period of time
in which these biotechs currently receive no revenues. Expectations of greater
revenues due to faster approval times increases the expected rate of return of
biotechnology companies encouraging investment in biotechs alleviating the cash
crunch faced by the industry. Furthermore, decreasing the length of time that
a small biotechnology company must nance all operations through outside
sources rather than through revenues generated from sales of a new drug de-
creases the risk that the company will cease operations due to a lack of capital.
b. Greater probability of approval. Private review of drugs will lead to a
higher probability that an NDA will be approved than under the current FDA
regime. Since FDA
0
s failure to approve drugs is often the result of political
conservatism rather than of scientic decision making, a private review organi-
zation, which is removed from politics, will approve more drugs. For example,
42Varivax, the chicken pox vaccine, was approved by two private advisory com-
mittees.139 Yet, the FDA refused to approve the drug for several years.
An increased probability of drug approval increases the value of
biotechnology companies to investors and reduces the cash crunch problem. As
stated earlier, the value of a biotechnology company to investors is based on
the present value of expected future earnings of the biotechnology company.
Expected future earnings of a biotechnology company equal the expected prot
derived from sales of drugs currently being developed if approved multiplied by
the probability that the drugs will be approved. The true value of a biotechnol-
ogy company equals the present value of the expected earnings derived from the
development of scientically benecial drugs. Currently, because the FDA re-
fuses to approve many scientically benecial drugs, biotechnology companies
0
investment values are less than their true values. Therefore, a private drug
approval body, by basing drug approval on science alone, will elevate the invest-
ment value of biotechnology companies to their true values which will encourage
greater investment in biotechnology companies.
c. Less regulation. Data requirements and pre-clinical and clinical regu-
lations will decrease. Much of the FDA
0
s over caution has manifested itself
in substantial data requirements and pre-clinical and clinical regulations. For
example, the current NDA application, which contains all of a drug
0
s data nec-
essary for an approval decision, may number in the hundreds of thousands of
1395ee Carey supra note 122.
43pages.140 Also, the FDA has come under re for implementing excessive regula-
tions in the early stages of clinical trials.141 In most cases, the early regulations
are simply to protect a limited number of test subjects. According to the Health
Care Policy Report:
George B. Rathman, chairman and chief executive ocer of ICOS Corp., a
biotechnology rm, ... said a major problem is the excessive caution of FDA
regulators during early clinical trial studies. He said companies that recommend
a reasonable risk level are instead faced with FDA suggestions and proposals to
increase dose levels, build in lengthy observation periods, and schedule discus-
sions with the FDA at each stage.142
Under the plan to replace the FDA with a private organization removed
from politics, it is inevitable that much of the current unnecessary regulatory
regime will be discarded. One of the missions of the private organization will
be to design the regulatory structure of drug review. In doing so, the private
organization will apply a cost benet analysis to regulations. Therefore, if a
regulation
0
s costs outweighs its benets then the regulation will be eliminated.
For example, if the required 12 months of chronic toxicity tests in two species of
animals during pre-clinical studies is extremely costly but produces little benet
in protecting Phase I test subjects, it will be reduced or eliminated altogether.
140
141
142Extreme Measures Against Agency Unlikely Despite Recent Criticisms, HEALTH CARE
POLICY REPORT, Jan. 23, 1995.
44A reduction in the data requirements for drug approval benets small biotech-
nology companies. A reduction in data requirements and regulations reduces
the cost of drug approval. Therefore, small biotechnology companies will require
less capital to sponsor a drug. This will enable these small biotechnology compa-
nies to diversify their portfolio of drugs which will reduce the risk of investing in
small biotechnology companies. Reducing the risk of biotechnology companies
will increase their expected returns. As a result, the industry
0
s capital crunch
will be alleviated substantially.
4. Disadvantages to this proposal. Even though the proposal to completely
remove FDA from the drug approval business and replace it with a private orga-
nization has considerable merit, there are several reasons why such a dramatic
measure should not be undertaken.
a. Fraud and corruption. Handing responsibility for drug approval over to
the drug industry subjects the drug approval system to a substantial risk of
fraud and corruption. A primary concern is that members of a private review
organization will be more likely to accept bribes than members of the FDA.
Currently, Congress
0
wide ranging ability to discipline the FDA is sucient to
prevent industry corruption of the FDA.143 However, a private review orga-
nization would remain outside of Congress
0
control, and therefore regulating
1435ee Beckner supra note 57.
45industry corruption of the private review organization would be extremely dif-
cult. Attempts by the industry to bribe the FDA have been common in the
past. For example, in 1989 revelations of corruption among FDA employees
and the generic drug industry came to light.144 Generic companies made ille-
gal bribes to FDA employees and phony bioequivalence testings comparing the
new drug to itself were used to gain approval.145 In response to increased Con-
gressional oversight of the FDA following the generic drug scandal, the FDA
instituted several important internal reforms which reduced the likelihood of
future corruption.146
Another argument may be asserted that a private review organization may
be biased toward the approval of new drugs because of their ties to the drug
industry. In other words, a private review organization may take a completely
opposite approach to drug approval than the FDA endangering public health.
While the argument that a private review organization may be subject to more
corruption than FDA has considerable merit, I do not believe that such a pri-
vate review organization will hold a bias toward approval of drugs which have
questionable scientic merit. First of all, conicts of interests can be eliminated.
Second, scientists and doctors are likely to base their decisions solely on scientic
merits to preserve their scientic reputations. Third, the interests of dierent
members of the drug industry often do not coincide. For example, a large phar-
144Bruce Kuhlik, The Origins of the Generic Drug Scandal and Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 385, 390.
145
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46maceutical company may be better o by a slow, costly drug approval process
because such a process serves as a barrier to entry for small biotechnology com-
panies who wish to develop products to compete with the large pharmaceutical
company.
b. The appearance of Impropriety. The lack of a governmental
organization responsible for drug approval creates the appearance of impropriety
concerning drug approvals creating a loss of faith in the safety of the drug
supply. Currently, the stamp FDA Approved upon a drug generates condence
in the market that the drug is safe and eective. As a result, individuals are
willing to use the FDA approved drug in order to cure or treat their ailment.
Therefore, drug companies, including biotechnology companies, are assured that
their product will have a market upon approval and approval will result in
considerable prots. On the other hand, a stamp on a drug stating Industry
Approved fails to convey to the public the same level of condence in the safety
and eectiveness of the particular drug. A general public perception exists,
whether accurate or not, that the drug industry
0
s interests do not coincide with
the public
0
s interests. Thus, the public may equate such an approval with an
advertisement rather than as a certication of a drug
0
s safety and eectiveness.
Since the demand for drugs is based on consumers condence in
the safety and eectiveness of the drug supply, if public condence declines,
demand for drugs will decline. As a result, drug sales will decline and the
industry will lose prots. Therefore, eliminating the FDA entirely from the drug
approval business and replacing it with a private organization may actually hurt
47biotechnology companies. A decrease in expected prots may completely oset
any gains from decreased costs associated with a private review of drugs.
c. Loss of FDA expertise. An argument may be asserted that
taking the FDA out of regulating drug approval would be foolish because the
FDA has developed considerable expertise after 30 years of experience with
reviewing drugs. However, during these 30 years the FDA has added regulation
after regulation based on its political conservatism increasing the cost and time
necessary for approval of a drug. Therefore, replacing the FDA with a private
review organization is justied simply because it will undo some of the FDA
0
s
past 30 years of work.
d. Not politically accountable. Another argument may be asserted that
review of drugs, which aects the lives of approximately 250 million American
citizens, should be conducted by a politically accountable organization such as
the FDA rather than by a private organization. Such an argument is based
on a libertarian notion that in a democracy individuals should have at least
an indirect voice in policies which aect them. According to the argument, if
individuals desire a greater supply of drugs rather than extra safe drugs, such a
result should be the product of the political process. Even though this argument
sounds compelling, I disagree with it. As I have argued earlier, the political
process leads to an inecient level of drug production resulting in benecial
drugs not being available to individuals who need them. The political process
will not work in the drug approval arena because of the inecient distribution
48of information to the public. The public takes quick notice to 5 children who
die in a clinical trial. However, the fact that a more ecient system would
produce more drugs to treat the thousands of individuals who suer each day
from diseases often goes unnoticed.
5. A better solution: modied privatization. From the foregoing discussion,
it is clear that privatizing the drug approval process holds substantial merit.
However, removing the FDA entirely from the drug approval process creates
problems of corruption and the appearance of impropriety. Therefore, I propose
the following drug regulatory structure:
a. A private review organization (which I will call PRO for purposes
of this proposal) should be established to review all drug data and make all drug
approval decisions. A summary of all data concerning a drug reviewed by the
PRO sucient to enable the FDA to assess a drug
0
s scientic costs and benets
must be sent to the FDA.
b. The PRO will be responsible for setting and implement-
ing all of the regulations concerning drug approval. This includes determining
what data is required for the NDA, how pre-clinical and clinical trials shall
be conducted, what types of steps must be taken in order to protect clinical
subjects, etc.
c. The FDA will regulate the PRO in the following ways. First, the
49FDA will establish conict of interest rules and enforce these rules. Second,
the FDA will establish certain PRO internal procedures necessary to minimize
the risk of corruption within the PRO. Third, the FDA will be responsible for
setting rules against industry fraud and corruption or against those industry
practices that have a dangerous likelihood of leading to the corruption of the
PRO. The FDA will also be responsible for enforcing these rules such as through
the imposition of sanctions. Fourth, the FDA may also pass rules requiring
informed consent of test subjects. However, these rules may not address the
amount of data required prior to testing on clinical test subjects.
d. The FDA may also issue policy statements governing the approval of
drugs. These policy statements will serve as advisement
0
s to the PRO and will
not be binding upon the PRO.
e. Upon approval of a drug by the PRO the drug is deemed to
be approved by the FDA 30 days following the PRO
0
s approval of the drug.
If the FDA wishes to challenge the PRO
0
s approval of a drug, a suit must
be instituted in Federal Court within this 30 day period. To prevent a drug
from being approved, the FDA must prove with clear and convincing evidence
that the drug
0
s scientic costs outweigh its scientic benets. If a suit is led,
the FDA may seek a preliminary injunction against distribution of the drug
for a maximum period of 60 days following PRO
0
s approval of the drug. This
preliminary injunction may be extended until completion of the suit, if the court
is convinced that distribution of the drug endangers the health and safety of
50the public. Endangering the health and safety of the public does not include
the harm resulting from the use of an ineective product.
f. Congress shall maintain all of its current avenues of direct control
over the FDA. Congress
0
direct control over the PRO shall be limited to funding.
This proposal ensures all the benets of privatization, while eliminating most of
the costs. This proposal overcomes the twin evils addressed by the Privatization
Proposal { conservative politics and governmental ineciencies { by placing drug
approval in the hands of the PRO. Congress is one step removed from inuencing
the PRO and therefore the PRO will be insulated from Washington politics.
Congress maintains the ability to inuence the FDA. However, my proposal
limits the ability of the FDA to inuence the PRO. FDA is not allowed to
regulate the scientic method conducted by the PRO. Rather, FDA
0
s role is to
ensure that the PRO
0
s process of reviewing data and setting standards is not
inuenced by industry corruption. The FDA may challenge the PRO
0
s approval
of a given drug, yet a hefty clear and convincing evidentiary standard must be
met. Therefore, the only drug approvals that will be overturned will be ones
approved under the specter of fraud or gross negligence.
In addition, my proposal eliminates the two disadvantages of the Privatiza-
tion Proposal { risks of corruption and appearances of impropriety. Under my
proposal, the FDA is given considerable latitude to prevent and punish PRO
corruption. Following the generic drug scandal in 1989, FDA passed several
internal procedures strengthening the FDA to eliminate the risk of corruption
51within the FDA.147 Likewise, I believe that the FDA will be able to regulate
the PRO to prevent corruption. Second, since the new system implements FDA
oversight over the PRO, greater condence will be generated in the market
concerning the eectiveness and safety of the drug supply. In addition to the
FDA
0
s ability to prevent PRO corruption, all drugs approved by the PRO will be
stamped FDA Approved. The FDA will receive summary information concern-
ing each drug reviewed by the PRO and will have the opportunity to challenge
any drug that is approved by the PRO. The regulatory framework I propose
maintains the FDA as ultimately responsible for the safety and eectiveness of
the drug supply. Therefore, demand for drugs will remain strong because the
market will remain condent in the safety and eectiveness of new drugs.
6. Other proposed solutions to restructure the FDA will fail to produce an ecient outcome.
Countless numbers of other proposals to re-structure the FDA in order to im-
prove the eciency of the drug approval process have been oered. For example,
Dr. Sidney Wolfe has argued that rather than tearing down the FDA we should
strengthen it by supplying the FDA with more money.148 Other proposals have
been made to require the FDA to make greater use of advisory groups to review
drug data and to make approval decisions.149 While both of these proposals ad-
dress some of the current problems with the FDA drug approval process, both
fall short of promoting both the ecient development of scientically benecial
1475ee Kuhlik supra note 144.
148Sidney W. Wolfe, M.D., Prepared Testimony before the House Committee on Appropri-
ations, Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies Hearing on
FDA Appropriations (Jan. 31, 1995) in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE.
1495ee Stone supra note 119.
52drugs and the ecient approval of scientically benecial drugs.
a. Expanded FDA. Supporters of expanding the FDA argue that greater
nancial resources will lead to faster drug approvals.150 These supporters believe
that the true problem with the current drug approval process is the 20 months
it currently takes to review an NDA.151 Greater nancial resources will lead to
more FDA personnel and a higher level of scientic expertise in the agency. More
personnel and greater scientic expertise should reduce backlogs and increase
eciency. Consequently, review times should decrease.
Evidence exists to support this theory. Since the passage of the User Fee Act
of 1992, drug review times have steadily decreased. For example, the average
time it took for the FDA to approve a new drug in 1994 was 19.7 months down
from the 26.5 months in 1993 (a 26% reduction).152 Furthermore, Kessler has
stated that the FDA plans to reduce review times to less than a year by 1997.153
150Two viable sources for increased funding exist: (1) tax revenues and (2) fees from drug
companies. If increasing the funding of FDA reduces the length of time of approvals, an
argument can be made that the government is justied in tapping either of these sources.
If the length of time for approvals decreases, more drugs will be developed and health care
costs will decrease. Therefore, taxpayers should be willing to bare the burden of an increase
in taxes to support the FDA because they will be compensated by lower health care costs.
Second, user fees could be adjusted to nance FDA
0
s decrease in drug approval time. On
October 29, 1992, the President signed into law the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992
which granted the FDA the right to collect more than$325 million over 5 years in user fees
from research-based pharmaceutical companies. User fees could simply be raised to nance
the increase in FDA personnel. Furthermore, to help smallbiotechnology companies, the user
fee might only be raised for those drug companies who already have drugs on the market. For
example, the user fee for each product on the market may have to be increased from $6000
per year to $25,000 per year while application fees for new products will not be raised. Thus,
the increase in user fees will result in an indirect transfer of wealth from established drug
companies to the small biotechnology companies.
151
152Piercey supra note 33 at 1.
153Carey supra note 122 at 73.
53However, increasing the nancial resources of the FDA fails to elim-
inate political conservatism from drug approval. Greater nancial resources do
not counteract the fact that the FDA outright refuses to approve certain scientif-
ically benecial drugs. Nor does this proposal in any way alleviate the problem
of excessive regulations in the pre-clinicals and clinicals. According to George
Rathman, Chairman and CEO of ICOS Corp. one of the major roadblocks to
biotechnology drugs is:
over-regulation and over-caution during Phase I and Phase II trials.
People are focusing on review times at the FDA when the real bottleneck is
the rst ve or six years of clinical investigation. .. User fees address the
problem late in the game, in the last year and a half of the drug development
process.154 Furthermore, this proposal inadequately addresses the problem of
FDA ineciency. Increasing the number of personnel will decrease the time
required for approval. However, increasing personnel will not remove the FDA
0
s
inability to create ideal incentives for its employees to review data eciently. As
a result, much of the increases in nancing will be wasted as is current funding
of FDA.
b. Greater use of advisory groups. Moderate versions of the pri-
vatization proposal have arisen. For example, several groups have argued that
the FDA should make greater use of private advisory groups to review data
and make drug approval decisions with the FDA having nal say over any drug
approval.155 The targeted benets from such a system are the same as pri-
154Piercy supra note 33 at 5.
1555ee Stone supra note 119; See also Usdin supra note 121.
54vatizing. The use of private advisory groups introduces a politically unbiased
scientic decision maker into the drug approval process who will approve drugs
on scientic merit alone.
However, this proposal will not result in an ecient level of drug develop-
ment and approval for two reasons. First, if the FDA has a veto power over
these advisory groups, the advisory groups are rendered virtually useless. For
example, earlier in this paper, I mentioned the failure of the FDA to approve
Varivax, a chicken pox vaccine. Two advisory groups recommended approval of
that drug and yet the FDA refused to act on these recommendations. Therefore,
this proposal will not produce an ecient level of drug approval. Second, even
if the FDA follows the advisory group
0
s approval recommendation every time,
the reform still fails to get rid of the FDA
0
s over regulation of pre-clinicals and
clinicals which reduces the level of drug development. Thus, this proposal fails
to achieve the ecient level of drug development. The best solution is to hand
over standard setting functions for drug testing to a private group.
B. Deregulation of the Drug Approval Process
Numerous proposals to deregulate the drug approval process reducing the
cost of drug approval have arisen during the past year. These proposals dif-
fer from privatization proposals by addressing the manner in which the FDA
regulates drug approval rather than by focusing on which entity regulates drug
approval. In analyzing the deregulation debate, I will keep this debate separate
55from the privatization debate. I will not address the eects of privatizing the
FDA on the deregulation debate. However, since I believe that my privatization
proposal will lead to the ecient level of regulation, if my privatization proposal
is accepted, a debate over deregulation in unnecessary. Therefore, my analysis
of the deregulation debate will assume that the FDA maintains control over the
drug approval process. First, I will focus my analysis on a current proposal to
eliminate all requirements of FDA approval for a drug to be marketed. Then, I
will propose other deregulatory reforms which will better serve the interests of
small biotechnology companies and the United States.
1. The Proposal: Elimination of the requirement of pre-market approval.
Several commentators have argued for the most radical form of deregulation of
the drug approval process: elimination of the requirement of pre-market FDA
approval of a drug.156 For example, the Washington D.C. based Competitive
Enterprise Institute proposes that the FDA should be stripped of its veto power
over the approval of drugs.157 The Competitive Enterprise Institute argues
that the FDA should serve as a certifying agency.158 If a drug is demonstrated
to be safe and eective in treating X disease according to the stringent FDA
standards, the drug would be certied as ~FDA approved for the treatment
of X disease. If the drug does not meet the FDA standards, the drug will be
stamped with The FDA has not approved this drug to be safe or eective in
1565ee Usdin supra note 121. See also Peter Brimelow and Leslie Spencer, Food and Drugs
and Politics, FORBES, Nov. 22, 1993 at 115.
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56the treatment of any disease. The Competitive Enterprise Institute feels this
modied regulation combined with common law negligence will serve the twin
interests of protecting the public while encouraging the ecient level of new
drug development.159
Other commentators have supported a modied form of this proposal. These
individuals have asserted that the FDA should only require proof of a drug
0
s
safety prior to approval. For example, Frederick Beckner, in an article written
in the Georgetown Law Journal, argues that the current drug review procedures
should be modied so that once a drug
0
s safety is established, the FDA should
allow it to be marketed.160 He argues that the drug manufacturer should not
be required to undertake the costly phase III clinical trials to demonstrate the
drug
0
s eectiveness.161 Rather, Beckner believes that information disclosure
should take the place of FDA approval in allowing consumers and physicians to
make informed choices about what drugs to take162 2. Benets from proposal.
The benets from eliminating pre-market approval are obvious. Eliminating
the current regulatory requirement for drug approval will substantially increase
drug innovation beneting both the drug industry and individuals in need of
159Brimelow supra note 156.
160Beckner supra note 57 at 559-561.
161
1621d. Beckner believes that standardized scores provide an eective way to convey drug
information to consumers. By referring to a scoring system, consumers will be able to make
comparisons between products. Without such a scoring system, no such comparisons will be
able to be made. According to his argument, a single standardized system allows information
to be conveyed to consumers and physicians cheaply and eciently. Under his scoring system,
the manufacturers will have to disclose the amount of time a drug has been tested, the observed
sideeects of the drug, and the severity of the side eects in a systematic, standardized manner.
Furthermore, manufacturers would be allowed to supplement this required information with
additional information.
57innovative therapies.
a. Benets to small biotechnology companies. Eliminating the
requirement of FDA approval creates obvious benets for the biotechnology
industry. This proposal eliminates the FDA approval process as the primary
barrier to a drug reaching the market. The $350 million that currently must be
invested before a drug may be marketed will be substantially reduced by this
proposal. No other proposal goes further to eliminate the cash crunch in the
biotechnology industry.
b. Benets to patients. This proposal will benet patients in need
of innovative treatments. With no barrier to selling drugs to sick individuals,
drug development will increase substantially. Currently, a multitude of poten-
tial drugs are not being developed because of the exorbitant cost of FDA drug
approval requirements. Therefore, drug production and innovation will increase
substantially with the passage of this proposal. Patients with life threatening
diseases will gain access to a much broader array of products with potentially
benecial aects. Furthermore, other individuals who have ailments which are
not life threatening and therefore have not been allowed quick access to exper-
imental drugs under current regulations also will gain access to a much larger
selection of drugs.
Also, patients will benet from lower health care costs. This pro-
posal will drive down drug prices and the cost of health care. Drug companies
will no longer have to charge high drug prices to recapture their drug approval
costs. Also, competition between a wide array of new drugs will drive the prices
58down. Lower drug prices combined with a wider array of drugs will lead to lower
health care costs. 3. Costs outweigh benets of proposal.
a. Problem of Asymmetric Information: Results in too much de-
mand for drug products. If drug consumers held perfect, costless information of
the benets and side eects of all drugs on the market, the proposal to remove
pre-market approval would be an ideal solution to alleviate problems suered
by the biotechnology industry. Consumers could decide whether to take a drug
or not based on their own cost benet analysis. Even if consumers did not hold
perfect information this proposal would lead to an ideal result if their doctors
held perfect information and they acted solely in their patient
0
s interest.
Unfortunately, neither consumers nor doctors have perfect informa-
tion. Manufacturers lack sucient incentives to provide full information about
their drug products and this information is otherwise unavailable or too complex
to evaluate.163 Manufacturers lack the incentives to produce drug information
for two reasons. First, customers are generally unsophisticated and even if they
are given all the information, they will be unable to make an accurate cost ben-
et analysis without the advice of a doctor. Second, an agency problem exists
between doctors and their patients.164 Doctors, who are generally responsible
for making the cost benet analysis for a patient, do not bear the costs of the
drug
0
s side eects.165 Therefore, doctors do not have the correct incentives to
1631d See also Henry Beales et al., The Ecient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24
J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981).
1645ee Beckner supra note 57.
165While a patient may sue a doctor for medical malpractice, it is unlikely that this threat
will cause doctors to acquire all information conceming a drug
0
s costs and benets because it
is doubtful that a doctor would be found liable for malpractice for not evaluating all of the
available data on a given
59evaluate all information on a drug
0
s costs and benets.
Even if drug companies provide information on drug products, ex-
perience has proven such a distribution of information fails to adequately in-
struct doctors or their drug before prescribing it. patients on the actual costs
and benets to using a drug. An article by Harold Pollack describes in detail
the aws in the provision of information by drug companies:
The pharmaceutical industry spends hundreds of millions of dollars every
year advertising prescription drugs. About half of this is spent by company
detailers, who promote products directly to doctors and pharmacists. As part
of the sales pitch, detailers often treat doctors to lunch, or oer complementary
trinkets, penlights, memo pads, or tickets to sporting events. Many doctors,
struggling to keep current about all the new products and warnings, nd detail-
ers a convenient source for information about potential side eects and proper
dosing of the medications they sell.
Detailing has attracted controversy due to a few well publicized scan-
dals. A 1973 Senate investigation revealed that companies instructed detail
men not to mention articles in medical journals that questioned the safety or
eectiveness of the drugs that they sell.
More recently, a March 1989 PBS Frontline documentary,
0
Prescriptions
for Prot,
0
claimed that detailers from McNeil Laboratories, a prominent drug
maker, had misled doctors about dangerous side eects of Zomax, a lucrative
new pain killer, during a $111 million sales campaign. The program presented
60internal McNeil memoranda encouraging detailers not to discuss possible ad-
verse reactions in their presentations to doctors, and to downplay these eects
in conversation if the subject came up. Several patients died from anphulactic
shock before the FDA forced Zomax
0
s removal from the market in early 1983.
Academic research lends credence to these concerns. A 1982 Har-
vard study examined physicians
0
knowledge of commonly prescribed vasodilator
medications for senile dementile and pain killers such as Darvon. Vasodilator
therapy, advertised as a way to improve impaired cerebral blood ow, has no
demonstrated therapeutic value. Similarly, despite marketing claims, clinical
tests consistently nd Darvon to be no more eective than aspirin for the relief
of mild to moderate pain. The study found that,
0
although the vast majority
of practitioners perceived themselves as paying little attention to drug adver-
tisements and detail men, as compared to the papers in the scientic literature,
their beliefs about the eectiveness of the index drugs revealed quite the op-
posite pattern.
0
Seventy-one percent of tested physicians agreed with erroneous
claims found in vasodilator promotions, and thirty-two percent reported that
they
0
nd cerebral vasodilators useful in managing confused geriatric patients.
0
Forty-nine percent of the sample believed that Darvon is more eective than
simple aspirin.166
This market failure based on asymmetrical information leads to excess de-
mand for undesirable drugs because consumers and doctors will fail to demand
166Harold Pollack, Faculty Seminar on Truthfulness in Management sponsored by the Har-
vard Program on Ethics and the Professions, Harvard Business School, and the Kennedy
School of Government, April 1989.
61more desirable substitutes.
AIDS
0
activists sudden objections to the FDA
0
s accelerated approval of AIDS
drugs serve as an example of the problems associated with the approval of a drug
before its costs and benets are adequately demonstrated. The accelerated
approval reduces substantially the amount of data that must be shown to the
FDA before the FDA allows the marketing of the drug. In essence, the fast
track approval system is a form of eliminating the FDA pre-market approval
requirements for certain life threatening drugs. As reported by an August 15,
1994 issue of Barrons:
Their [AIDS activists, some physicians, and even some drug companies] com-
plaint is that AIDS drugs are coming to market in confusing profusion. Because
testing has been done in a rush, full details about the new drugs
0
side eects
and basic eectiveness are unknown. The kind of data that have come out of
these clinical studies is uninterpretable and ambiguous, charges [Derick] Link
[representative of Gay Men
0
s Health Crises]. No one knows when to take them,
how best to use them, or if the toxicities outweigh the benet.167
Supporters of the proposal to end the requirement of FDA approval have
failed to adequately address this problem of information disparities between
drug companies and drug consumers. They have argued that imposing liability
167Edward A. Wyatt, Rushing to Judgment, BARRoN
0
S, Aug. 15, 1994 at 23.
62on drug manufacturers will force drug companies to convey accurate informa-
tion to the market concerning a drug
0
s costs and benets.168 According to the
argument, if strict liability was imposed on the drug manufacturers, the drug
manufacturers would have to internalize all costs and benets of their product.
Therefore, it would be in their interests to make sure that patients would use
the product only when the benets to the patient outweighed the costs.
There are several responses to this argument. First, liability may provide
drug companies with incentives to provide safety information, however it is not
clear how liability will cause companies to disseminate information on eective-
ness. While it may be easy for a patient who suers serious side eects from a
drug to sue for compensation, it would probably be extremely tough to recover
against a drug company because the drug failed to cure a particular disease.
Second, it is not clear what threshold of safety would have to passed before
recovery would be allowed. A drug company would not be held liable for every
side eect the drug causes because practically all drugs cause side eects. There-
fore, there would have to be some threshold such as a severely debilitating side
eect for a recovery. Such a threshold would dilute a company
0
s incentives to
produce information. Third, as emphasized throughout the paper, much of the
drug industry is made up of small companies with practically no assets. There-
fore, liability may do little to create incentives because the small companies
producing drugs have little at stake. Fourth, as stated earlier, dissemination of
1685ee Usdin supra note 121.
63information serves little purpose if doctors do not have the correct incentives to
evaluate this information correctly. Therefore, unless doctors are instilled with
the proper incentives to evaluate a drug
0
s costs and benets properly, drug com-
panies may nd that it serves no purpose to disseminate accurate information.
Also, if doctors fail to adequately evaluate the information, it is irrelevant that
the drug companies produce the ecient amount of information. b. Delays in
the production of information: Results in too much demand for drug products.
Even if drug companies disseminate information on drugs they sell because this
information will increase sales and reduce their liability. This information to a
large extent will follow a drug
0
s introduction onto the market especially when
the drug is introduced by a small biotechnology company. For example, a small
biotechnology company with no current products or revenue facing nancing
problems which develops a drug with preliminary signs of safety and ecacy
likely will introduce the product to the market and will continue with testing
to generate more information about the drug. The danger with this system
is that a drug is available to all American citizens without the availability of
adequate information on its safety. Such a situation will inevitably result in
another thalidomide-type tragedy.
c. Loss of condence in the market for drugs: Results i too little
demand for drug products. Another argument may be made against this pro-
posal based on an entirely dierent view of the United States market for drugs
following the implementation of this proposal. The removal of FDA drug ap-
proval requirements may create a state of considerable uncertainty in the U.S.
64market for drugs. Doctors and patients may not be able to adequately evaluate
the scientic merits of a particular new drug. Consequently, the demand for all
new drugs may decline. Another result may be that drug consumers might de-
mand only drugs manufactured by the large well established drug manufacturers
based on the perception that these manufacturers produce safer products than
the small biotechnology companies. Both of these outcomes negatively impact
small biotechnology companies.
4. A better solution: deregulating early pre-clinical and clinical trials. granting drug companies the right to charge experimental drug patients, and expanding drug companies
0
right to export unapproved drugs. While I disagree with the proposal to undo
FDA pre-marketing requirements, I do believe that certain changes must be
made to the current drug approval process to reduce the cost of drug approval.
As stated earlier, the heart of the problem faced by small biotechnology com-
panies is that the drug review process is extremely costly and biotechnology
companies with no products generate no prots to nance this process. There-
fore, the cost of drug review must be reduced wherever possible. However,
reductions in cost must only be implemented if their benets outweigh their
costs. Given this cost benet analysis, I propose the following changes to the
FDA drug approval process: (1) Pre-clinical regulations requiring preliminary
evidence of a drug
0
s safety prior to the commencement of human trials should
be eliminated; (2) Regulations designed to protect the safety of clinical sub-
jects of early clinical trials should be eliminated; (3) Drug companies should
be allowed to charge clinical test subjects; and (4) Drug export laws should be
65modied so that U.S. biotechnology companies are granted greater freedom to
export unapproved drugs to foreign countries.
a. Eliminating all pre-clinical regulations requiring preliminary ev-
idence of a drug
0
s safety. Prior to human testing, extensive animal testing must
be conducted to establish the safety of the drug for use in experimental groups.
Following pre-clinical testing, an extensive IND application must be led with
the FDA which in addition to the testing takes considerable time to prepare.169
It has been a common charge of the drug industry and commentators that these
requirements are overly excessive based on the FDA
0
s continuing desire to place
the protection of a small number of clinical subjects above the health of the
entire United States population.170 These large frontend costs associated with
drug development substantially limit the number of drugs which small biotech-
nology companies may pursue and increase the risk of a biotechnology company
0
s
failure. Therefore, eliminating these pre-clinical regulations will alleviate much
of the cash crunch facing the biotechnology industry.
The benets from eliminating these pre-clinical regulations outweigh the
costs. First, extensive animal toxicity tests seem to serve little purpose. Twelve
month studies do not appear to be necessary to determine toxicity in animals.
According to the European scientic community, these animal toxicity tests pro-
duce few manifestations of toxicity after 3 months and no signicant ndings
after 6 months.171 Also, animal tests may screen out potentially safe and ben-
1695ee supra note 7.
1705ee Piercy supra note 33.
171Dillman supra note 4 at 928.
66ecial drugs. For example, Sir Alexander Fleming claimed that penicillin is on
the market today because it was never tested on animals.172 Fleming has stated
that had he known of penicillin
0
s animal toxicity, he never would have tried it
on humans.173 Animal studies also often fail to reveal all of the potentially
signicant toxic eects of a drug in human beings. Some drugs that pose no
side eects to animals may pose side eects to humans.174 For example, a study
of 6 chemically dissimilar drugs that had been tested extensively in rats, dogs
and humans showed that animal testing failed to reveal more than fty percent
of the toxic eects in human beings.175
Second, drug manufacturers will conduct the ecient level of pre-clinical
studies on a drug
0
s safety. Investors will require preliminary evidence of a drug
0
s
safety and ecacy before they will nance human clinical studies. Also, drug
manufacturers will have to compensate clinical subjects for the risk they bear.
Test subjects will demand more money if the risks to their health are higher.
Thus, manufacturers will have incentives to conduct pre-clinical tests to the
extent that the marginal cost of further tests is less than the marginal value
of the resultant reduction in risk. Strict requirements of informed consent will
ensure that test subjects adequately evaluate the risks when deciding whether
to enter into a drug study.
172Id:
173Id:
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67Third, my analysis of de-regulating pre-clinical trials diers from de-regulating
the entire drug approval process because if a mistake is made fewer people are at
risk. In Phase I and Phase II, no more than a couple of hundred volunteers are
tested. Furthermore, upon discovery of a harmful side eect, a quick response
can be made. Therefore, the use of an unsafe drug in these trials will have
limited eects. On the other hand, an unsafe drug released onto the U.S. drug
market could reach millions of people and removing the drug from the market
may be extremely dicult.
b. Eliminating early clinical regulations designed to protect the
safety of clinical subjects. My justications for this proposal are the same as for
the above proposal. As I have stated earlier, one of the major problems faced
by small biotechnology companies is the excessive caution of the FDA during
early clinical trials. Drug companies have recommended reasonable risk levels
in early clinicals.176 However, the FDA's response has been to suggest increased
dose levels, lengthy observation periods and countless meetings with the FDA
to discuss the safety to clinical subjects.177 As in the above proposal, I believe
that the risks are minimal and can be justied by the substantial benets of
decreasing the cost of drug approval for small biotechnology companies.
c. Allowing drug companies to charge their clinical test subjects. I propose
that current FDA regulations should be changed to allow drug companies to
charge their test subjects for the experimental treatment they receive. Cur-
176Piercy supra note 33.
177Id:
68rently, the FDA does not allow drug companies to charge for Investigational
drugs except under certain exceptions for drugs that treat life threatening ill-
nesses. The current rule against charging for experimental drugs actually dis-
criminates against small biotech companies in favor of the large pharmaceutical
companies. Large pharmaceutical manufacturers with millions of dollars in sales
revenues are able to nance the drug experimentation process. However, small
biotechnology companies who have no current income and are not allowed to
recover their drug development costs by charging their patients are often driven
out of the market or are forced to sell their technology to the larger companies.
Allowing small biotechnology companies to charge their patients would remedy
this situation.
Furthermore, allowing drug companies to charge for clinical trials would
supplement my proposal to deregulate pre-clinical trials and early clinical trials.
Allowing drug companies to charge would provide these companies with an
added incentive to prove that their drug has limited risks.
Several arguments against this proposal can be anticipated. First,
allowing companies to charge for unapproved drugs decreases the incentive for
companies to get approval for unapproved drugs. However, the FDA might
limit the price that can be charged for experimental drugs or the FDA might
limit the size of the clinical group. Either action will give drug companies
ample incentives to obtain drug approval. Second, how can drug companies
charge their test subjects in a blind experiment where some of the patients
69receive a placebo? In response, drug companies may charge all of the test
subjects up front but then grant refunds to those who received the placebo.
Another solution would be to charge all of the patients an average cost for
the testing and patients would be subject to the risk that they must pay for
the placebo. Both of these solutions are even more workable given insurance
markets. d. Modifying the current drug export laws to expand the ability of
drug companies to export unapproved drugs. The current unapproved drug
export laws should be modied to give U.S. drug companies greater ability to
sell unapproved drugs to foreign markets. I agree with a February 27, 1995 press
release by Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) calling for modications
to current U.S. export laws reducing restrictions on the exportation of innovative
drugs to patients in other countries.178
Currently, the right to export unapproved drugs to foreign coun-
tries is limited. Exports of most unapproved drugs and biologics are limited to
21 countries listed in section 802(b)(4)(A) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act.179 Shipment of unapproved drugs to unlisted countries is expressly
prohibited~ For a drug to be eligible for export, the drug must be the subject of
an IND and U.S. marketing approval for the drug must be actively pursued.180
Also, the drug must be approved for marketing in the country receiving the
drug.181
178Biotechnology Industry Organization, FDA Reform. Achievable Steps to Improve Access
to New Therapies and Cures, Feb. 27, 1995.
179Jerey N. Gibbs, Movement of biotechnology-Derived Products Exports, Imports and
Transit, 256 PLI/PAT 33 (1988).
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70Restricting exports to 21 approved countries and requiring an approved IND
prior to export protects foreign countries at the expense of the U.S. biotechnol-
ogy industry. These restrictions on exports impede the growth of the U.S.
biotechnology industry. The restrictions have two eects. First, biotechnology
companies developing new drug products are denied a source of nancing. Sec-
ond, the restrictions encourage biotechnology companies to build plants over
seas in foreign countries that desire the new drug products but are unable to
get them because of the U.S. export restrictions. As stated earlier in this paper,
the movement of biotechnology companies to foreign countries is particularly
troublesome for the U.S. biotechnology industry. Modifying current U.S. ex-
port laws to expand the right of biotechnology companies to export unapproved
drugs will alleviate these problems. As stated by BIO in a Feb. 27, 1995 press
release:
The biotechnology industry developed from scientic advances made in this
country. Permitting the exportation of innovative products to patients in other
countries will retain the fruits of this investment.182
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States has one of the most sophisticated drug approval sys-
tems in the world. This intricate system, directed by the FDA, has generated
182Biotechnology Industry Organization supra note 178 at 2.
71considerable condence in the safety and eectiveness of marketed drugs. How-
ever, the United States
0
system of drug approval entails exhorbitant costs which
have adversely aected the infant biotechnology industry. Small biotechnology
companies, unable to generate sucient funds to nance the drug approval
process, face possible extinction. The potential decline of small biotech com-
panies threatens innovative drug development and the United States
0
reign as
a global leader in biotechnology. Therefore, the United States would benet
from changes in the current FDA drug approval process that would prevent the
decline of small biotechnology companies without endangering the safety and
eectiveness of the drug supply. In this paper, I have attempted to analyze
some of the current proposals to change drug approval as to their ability to
solve this problem. I have also presented my own proposals which I believe
will benet biotechnology companies without imposing unnecessary risks on the
U.S. population.
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